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PEoPLE

[Crim. No. 5201.

v.

'rHoJI!IAs

In Bank.

[37 C.2d

May 1, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. HENRY THOMAS,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of

Degree of Offense on Plea of Guilty.-Defendant cannot successfully urge that the court erred in failing to take evidence
in ascertaining the degree to be first degree murder and the
penalty death, after a plea of guilty on a murder charge, where
the court considered the evidence of the decedent's husband
and that taken at the preliminary hearing, which evidence
amply established that the murder was committed during
an attempt to commit robbery, where the defendant was not
foreclosed from offering evidence, and where he thereafter
stood mute when asked if he had any legal cause why sentence
should not be pronounced.
[2] !d.-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of Degree of
Offense on Plea of Guilty.-A statutory hearing for the determination of the degree of an offense and the punishment
therefor, after a plea of guilty, is not governed by the same
strict rules of procedure as a trial; it is the duty of the court
to consider matters in aggravation as well as mitigation of the
offense, and it may examine into the legal significance of
established facts and consider many matters not admissible
on the issue of guilt or innocence.
[3] !d.-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment lmposed.-The appellate court is without authority to reduce the penalty from
death to life imprisonment, where there is no error in the
proceedings for the determination of the degree of murder
and the punishment therefor after a plea of guilty to the
charge. (Pen. Code, § 1260.)

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Siskiyou County.
James M. Allen, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 457; 15 Am.Jur. 167.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law,§ 1000; [3] Criminal
Law, §1446.
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Mark M. Brawman and George A. Tebbe, under appointment
by the Supreme Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Henry Thomas, having pleaded
guilty to murder (Pen. Code, § 187) the court found the
murder to be of the first degree, and imposed the death penalty.
The appeal is here by operation of law. Charged with defendant, was William McCain, who pleaded not guilty. McCain was tried, found guilty, and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. Also charged with the same crime, and
ordered held to answer at the preliminary examination was
Joe Cooper, but what disposition has been made of the charge
against him, if any, does not appear.
According to the evidence taken when the degree and punishment were fixed, and at the preliminary hearing, Mr. and Mrs.
Ainsworth were managing a grocery store near Hatfield,
Siskiyou County, California, on October 20, 1950. About
5 :30 in the afternoon, while the Ainsworths were present in
the store, defendant and McCain entered it, McCain in the lead.
Defendant ordered soft drinks. McCain drew a pistol and
stated it was a holdup. Defendant also drew a pistol. Ainsworth grasped the barrel of the pistol held by McCain and in
the ensuing struggle it was discharged, a bullet striking and
wounding Mr. Merrill, who entered the store at that time.
After McCain's gun discharged, defendant fired several shots
from his pistol, two of which struck Mrs. Ainsworth, causing
her death. McCain and defendant fled and were finally apprehended in Bakersfield.
Defendant urges two grounds for reversal: (1) The court
erred in failing to take evidence to ascertain the pemilty to be'
imposed. (2) The penalty should be reduced to life imprison~
ment under section 1260 of the Penal Code, as amended in
1949. (Stats. 1949, ch. 1309, § 1.)
Defendant was held to answer following a preliminary
examination and an information was filed against him. On
December 4, 1950, he was arraigned and not having means to
employ counsel, one was appointed for him-Mr. Mark M.
Brawman. Time to plead was set for December 6, 1950, at
his counsel's request. At that time, after a brief appearance
in court, counsel for defendant and McCain's counsel, and
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the district attorney retired to the judge's chambers where
the judge said that Mr. Brawman had spoken to him in regard to the possibility of defendant's avoiding the death penalty by making a ''certain'' plea. The judge remarked that he
had read the transcript of the preliminary hearing and that
he was ''inclined'' to give the ''extreme'' penalty whether he
pleaded guilty or not guilty. On returning to court, defendant
pleaded guilty and December 11, 1950, was fixed as the time
for "pronouncing judgment," later continued to December
14, 1950, when the court announced it would hear evidence
on the degree of the offense. The district attorney called
decedent's husband, Ainsworth, to the stand and he testified
to the facts relating to the killing. Defendant's counsel was
a~ked by the court if he wished to cross-examine and declined.
The court then remarked: ''Step down (addressing the witness) . I don't think we will need any further." The district
attorney then made the same remark, to which the court
replied ''All right.'' Defendant's counsel remained silent.
The court then stated that it was murder of the first degree.
Thereafter when asked by the court whether he had any legal
cause to show why sentence should not be pronounced, defendant stood mute. The death penalty was imposed.
There is no question that the evidence is ample to establish
murder of the first degree, for it was committed while attempting to commit robbery. (Pen. Code, § 189.) [1] Defendant's excuse for not offering any evidence on the question of penalty is that the court's remark heretofore quoted
foreclosed such offer. That remark may not necessarily be
so construed, and the court, as seen, did not only take the
evidence on the subject consisting of Ainsworth's testimony,
but also the evidence given at the preliminary hearing which
went into the details of the crime from the planning of it to
the flight. Moreover, defendant stood mute when asked if
he had any legal cause to show why sentence should not be
pronounced and it was not until then that the death sentence
was "pronounced." [2] The rule is stated: "In determining
the degree of an offense and the punishment to be imposed,
after a plea of guilty, it is the duty of the trial court to consider matters in aggravation as well as in mitigation of the
offense. The legal significance of established facts may well
constitute an element of which cognizance is taken in the
exercise of judicial discretion. A hearing for the determination of the degree of .an offense and the punishment therefor
is not a trial in the full technical sense, and is not governed
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bv the same strict rules of procedure as a trial. As stated in
People v. Williams, 14 Cal.2d 532, 536 [95 P.2d 456] (quoting
from People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 153, 158 [177 N.E. 739,
77 A.L.R. 1199] ) it is 'simply a statutory hearing, by which
the court examined witnesses to determine whether any facts
existed to aggravate or mitigate the punishment,' and 'in
considering evidence in aggravation or mitigation of the
offense the court may consider many matters "not admissible
on the issue of guilt or innocence" . . . ' " (People v. Gilbert,
22 Cal.2d 522, 528 [140 P.2d 9].) And as said by this court
in People v. Forbes, 219 Cal. 363, 372 [26 P.2d 466]: "He
[defendant] cannot now complain that he sat mute with his
attorneys at his side while evidence of his wicked crime was
given by the several witnesses. That he offered no evidence,
if any there was, which was not included in the ample statements and confessions made by himself and Mrs. Nelson, was
a matter wholly within the control of his attorneys, who might
have examined each witness at length and, no doubt, could
have obtained a continuance upon the asking, for the production of evidence tending to mitigate the offense, if such existed." And also what was said in People v. Jackson, 36 Cal.2d
281, 288 [223 P.2d 236], is applicable: "Finally, there is defendant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing the death penalty upon him. 'rhe contention seems
pointless. Admittedly the homicide here involved was committed in the perpetration of a robbery, and as such constituted murder of the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189, People
v. Bautista, 22 Cal.2d 867, 869 [141 P.2d 417] ; also, People
v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, 791 [161 P.2d 227] ; People v. Isby,
30 Cal.2d 879, 888 [186 P.2d 405] .) While defendant urges
that the killing was 'accidental . . . precipitated by the unfortunate attempt of the deceased to wrestle the gun from
defendant,' and that the 'Probation Officer reported . . . a
recommendation of life imprisonment,' these same matters
were fully argued at the hearing to determine the degree of
murder and the sentence to be imposed therefor. Their
evaluation in the light of the entire record was for the trial
court's consideration, and it unquestionably appears that the
trial court, acting within its discretion and upon a consideration of all the circumstances, fixed the sentence in accordance
with the statutory authority vested in it.''
[3] Authority was not gTanted to the court by the amendment to section 1260 of the Penal· Code to reduce the penalty
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from death to life imprisonment in this case for the ''amendment [to § 1260] did no more than bring section 1260 into
accord with section 1181 ( 6) with respect to reduction of the
degree of an offense and make clear that the court may reduce
the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when there is
error relating to the punishment imposed. The test for determining what action should be taken remains the same : was
there prejudicial error in the proceedings? When, as in this
case, the trial court is vested with discretion to determine the
punishment (Pen. Code, § 190), and there has been no error,
this court has no power to substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court." (People v. Odle, ante, p. 52 [230 P.2d
345].) There was no error in the proceedings in this case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
SHENK, J.-I concur in the judgment but I do not agree
with the very definite suggestion in the majority opinion that
this court has the power under section 1181 ( 6) or section 1260
of the Penal Code, even in the presence of error, to reduce
the punishment and thus commute the sentence from death
to life imprisonment or any lesser period. That power is
exclusively vested in the governor of the state by section 1
of article VII of our Constitution. My views are more fully
expressed in my concurring opinion in People v. Odle, ante,
p. 52.

